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The Consent Exception to
The Warrant Requirement

One

by H. PatrickFurman
exception to the general

rule that authorities must
obtain a warrant before conducting a search is the consent exception. This article discusses
that exception, the procedure for proving that the exception applies and various opinions examining the exception.

An Overview of the
Consent Exception
In virtually identical language, both
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Judicial enforcement of this provision did not
begin in earnest until this century.' Enforcement of the provision through the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter2
misconduct by law enforcement officials,
although it also serves the purpose of
maintaining
the integrity of the judici3
ary.
A search conducted without benefit of
warrant is presumed unreasonable and
in violation of the constitutional prohibition. 4 The prosecution can overcome this
presumption by proving that valid consent was obtained prior to the search.5 A
consent to search surrenders the legitimate expectation of privacy protected by
the Constitution and waives the warrant
requirement. 6 If the person to be searched
validly consents to the search, there is
no police misconduct and there is no justification for excluding
evidence obtained
7
in that search.

Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman,
University of Colorado School of
Law, Boulder-(303) 492-8126

The definition of a search does not include all police intrusions. Simply knocking on a person's door does not amount
to a search, since the occupant retains
the right not to answer.8 Similarly, a
proper investigative detention pat-down
of a suspect does not require consent. 9

Procedural and
General Considerations
A defendant may raise a claim that
evidence was improperly seized without
valid consent by filing a motion to suppress. The defendant may always challenge his or her own purported consent
but does not automatically have standing to challenge consent given by another. In People v. Henry,10 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the defendant,
who was a passenger in a car that had
been lawfully stopped by the police, was
not entitled to automatic standing to contest the search of the car conducted with
the consent of the owner. The defendant's
mere presence in the car did not give him
a reasonable expectation of privacy conferring standing to contest the search."
Once a claim is raised, the burden is
on the prosecution to prove that the consent exception applies. 12 The determination of whether consent was given is
based on a consideration of the totality
of the circumstances.'3 These circumstances include the age, intelligence, education and knowledge of the purpose of
the search of the person giving consent,
as well as any promises, threats, overbearing conduct or misrepresentations
14
by the authorities.
The prosecution must prove the existence of consent by clear and convincing
evidence. 15 Unless the trial court specifically bases its ruling on the Colorado
Constitution, appellate courts presume

that the ruling
is based on the U.S. Con16
stitution.
Appellate courts are to accept the factual findings of the trial court as long as
they are supported by the record, even
when the reviewing court disagrees with
the findings." In People v. Diaz,18 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court order suppressing evidence seized
from the defendant when he was arrested and searched in a bar without a warrant. The trial court resolved certain
credibility issues in favor of the defendant, made detailed findings that the
actions of the police were such as would
convince an ordinary person that he or
she was under arrest and found that the
"request" of the police to search was more
in the nature of an order. These findings
were supported by the record and the
trial court's credibility determinations.
The trial court's conclusion that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving consent was therefore affirmed.
Trial courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver. 19
Thus, ambiguous or imprecise questions
or answers may result in a finding that
the prosecution has failed to prove consent. In People v. Thomas,20 a police officer requested consent to search both the
defendant and his car in one question.
The trial court made a finding that this
compound question resulted in an ambiguous answer. The Supreme Court considered itself bound by this finding because it was supported by the record,21
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and affirmed the trial court's suppression order even while strongly hinting
that it might have reached a different
conclusion had it been sitting as the finder of fact.
Consent must be voluntary. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that proof that consent was
voluntary requires a showing that there
has been "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right." That
Court also has described the prosecution's burden as one of proving "that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." 2
The Colorado Supreme Court has offered several similar descriptions of the
requirement. In People v. Reyes, 24 the
court held that proof of voluntariness requires proof".. . that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied; and
that the consent was unequivocal and
specific and freely and intelligently given." Similarly, in People v. Savage,25 the
court held that a valid consent "must be
the product of a free choice and must not
be the result of duress, coercion, threats,
or promises that are calculated to flaw
the free and unconstrained nature of the
decision."26 In People v. Thiret,27 voluntariness was described as meaning that
the "consent was not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied, or any
other form of undue influence exercised
against the defendant."2
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graphs and film was improper. On the other hand, consent to "search" a home encompasses police actions such as photo31
graphing and measuring the premises.
The person giving consent may specifically limit the scope of the consent. In
People v.Billington,32 the defendant in a
bad check case consented to a search of
his hotel room to find papers belonging
to the victim and relating to the common business interest of himself and the
victim. The Supreme Court held that
the police must stay within the limitations of this consent or obtain a warrant
for a more general search. However, the
court went on to hold that this search
was within the scope of the limited consent.

"Proof that consent was
voluntary requires a showing
that there has been
'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of
a known right.'"

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
consent to search the interior of a car
justified the search of any closed containers in the car that might reasonably
contain the object of the search. 33 A police officer had stopped the car and asked
to search for drugs. He found a kilo of coThe Scope of Consent
caine inside a rolled up paper bag on the
The fact that consent is given does not floor.
The most recent Colorado opinion on
authorize the police to search anywhere
or for as long as they wish. Consent "may the scope of consent is People v. Olivas,3
in which the Supreme Court reversed
be confined in scope to specific items...
or may be restricted to certain areas or lo- the suppression of marijuana found hidcation ... or otherwise may be limited in den behind the door panels of a car. The
purpose and time." 29 The scope of the defendant was stopped because his windconsent may be limited by the language shield was cracked. Due to some suspiof the request or by the language of the cious information, the officer asked if the
consent. A number of cases have ad- defendant would consent to a search of
dressed the scope of a consent to a search. the car, and the defendant agreed. The ofThe specific language of the request to ficer found nothing in the car or in the
search may limit the scope of the search. trunk, but then noticed that the door panIn Thiret,3° the police arrived at the defen- el on the driver's door was loose. Using
dant's home without a warrant and asked his flashlight, the officer saw what apif they could "look around." The defen- peared to be marijuana hidden in the
dant said yes, and the police then spent door, pried the panel off and found marforty-five minutes searching the entire ijuana. Analyzing the issue on federal
house, including piles of clothes and de- grounds only, the court noted that conbris, boxes and drawers. The Colorado Su- sent may be specifically limited by the
preme Court ruled that this search ex- suspect, but held that consent does auceeded the scope of the consent and that thorize a thorough and careful search.
the subsequent seizure of some photo- The court held that the search was with2106/THE COLORADO
LAWYER
I SEPTEMBER
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in the scope of the consent and was reasonable. 5
Consent is not limitless in terms of time,
either. People v. rujillo36 held that "the

question of the temporal scope of a consent to search is also a question of fact
to be determined in light of all of the circumstances." 7 In Trujillo, the defendant
consented to a search of his impounded
car on August 9. The police found nothing, but searched the car again two days
later after their suspicions were aroused
by the repeated demands of the defendant's wife to return the car. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the second search fell within
the temporal scope of the consent because
the consent was not limited in time by its
own terms and because the defendant
should have foreseen that his car would
remain impounded for some period of
time.
Once consent is granted, it may not be
withdrawn. In People v. Heimel,38 the
Colorado Supreme Court held that an air
traveler who impliedly consented to a
search by beginning the security screening process could not withdraw that consent by withdrawing from the checkpoint. Similarly, the court has held that
a person who initially consented to a
search of his car trunk could not change
his mind and validly withdraw
consent
39
after the search began.

Third-Party Consent
In certain situations, a person other
than the defendant may give valid consent to search. Whether a third party may
validly consent usually turns on the relationship of the third party to the property to be searched (for example, the owner/occupier may give consent) or the relationship of the third party to the person who is the target of the search.4° Generally, the person with the principal right
to occupancy is the only person who may
give consent. However, there are a number of situations in which third parties
may validly consent to a search. Appellate courts have addressed the issue in a
number of opinions.
In the case of rental property, it is normally the tenant who has the sole right
to give consent.41 A landlord who found
marijuana in a house she leased to the defendant on a month-to-month basis did
not have authority to authorize the police to search the home. 42 However, a cotenant has the authority to authorize a
search of the common areas of the shared
property,4 and a co-tenant who shares
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specific rooms with the suspect may authorize a search of those rooms.4 In a situation where the landlord was the defendant's mother, occupied the same premises and controlled access to all parts of
the premises, she had authority to consent to a search of the home, and the police could lawfully arrest the defendant
45
after spotting him inside.
The owner or occupier of property
may cede the authority to consent to a
search to a third person. The defendant
in People v. Rivers," gave his trailer key
to the owner of the trailer park in which
he lived and told him to use the key in
case of emergency. The owner called the
police after getting complaints about offensive odors emanating from the trailer. A police search yielded a dead body.
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the
search, holding that the defendant had
granted the power to consent to the third

party.
The consent of one spouse to allow a
search of the premises binds the other
spouse.4 The issue in People v. Payne"
was whether the defendant's estranged
wife had authority to consent to a search
of the jointly owned marital home after
she had moved out. After the defendant

was arrested on a suspicion of sexually
assaulting the wife, the wife entered the
home and gave police permission to
search. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction, noting that
the defendant and the victim had a common interest in the home and that the
victim went to the home to retrieve some
of her personal property. The court held
that she had the authority to consent.
Actual authority to consent to a search
is not a prerequisite of third-party consent if the police were justified in an objectively reasonable belief that the party
giving consent had authority. In People
v. McKinstrey,49 the Colorado Supreme
Court reviewed a trial court order suppressing evidence found in the search of
a mountain cabin. An officer searched
the cabin after learning some suspicious
information about the occupant and after a nearby resident named Drumm
claimed part ownership of the cabin and
consented to the search. The trial court
found that Drumm did not possess authority to consent to a search because he
did not have joint access to and control
over the cabin for most purposes. The trial court based its suppression order on
this finding.

The Supreme Court held that the factual finding was supported by the record
but that the finding did not resolve the
constitutional issue. The federal constitutional analysis is governed by Illinois
v. Rodriguez,5° which held that the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applies to the analysis of
consent searches and that it does not automatically bar all "consent" searches
that are conducted without proper consent. If the officers conducting the search
believed they had valid consent, and if
that belief was objectively reasonable, the
results of the search should not be suppressed. The officers should make inquiry regarding the authority of the person giving consent to do so. 51 Because
the trial court in McKinstrey did not fully consider this question, the case was remanded for further findings. Colorado's
Supreme Court explicitly declined to consider the issue under the Colorado Constitution.
The most recent Colorado Supreme
Court decision on the issue of third-party
consent is People v. Hopkins.52 In Hopkins, three police officers investigating
an illegal fireworks call were approached
by the defendant and two other people.
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When identification was requested, the
defendant accompanied one officer to his
apartment to get identification, and the
other two people stayed with the other
two officers. When these two people indicated that they did not have identification, one officer asked to look in the
fanny pack one of them was carrying. The
person consented, and the officer found
crack cocaine, marijuana and identification belonging to the defendant inside.
Both people then indicated that the fanny pack belonged to the defendant.
The trial court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress, but the Supreme
Court reversed. The test for third-party
consent was described as whether the
facts available to the officer at the time
of the search justify a reasonably cautious person in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the proper53
ty, and the court held that such facts

did exist. Neither the fact that the consenting party did not have actual consent, nor the failure of the officers to inquire into the ownership of the pack altered this conclusion.

Implied Consent
Normally, the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right requires express
consent by the person holding the right.
However, in certain situations, the Colorado Supreme Court has found that
consent may be implied by the actions of
the defendant. In Heimel,54 discussed
above, the court held that entering an
airport and beginning the security screening process constituted a consent to a
search.
In People v. Renfrow,55 police officers
were inspecting a car that was believed
to have been involved in a recent burglary. The defendant approached them,
gave information about the car, volunteered that he had the keys inside and
invited them in. The house was dark, and
the officers had to use their flashlights,
revealing stolen property in plain view.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the defendant voluntarily consented for
the police to enter, grafted the plain view
exception onto the consent exception and
upheld the admission of the results of
the search.
An invitation to enter a residence, coupled with an agreement to speak with the
officers, also was held to be a consent to
a search in People v. Clouse.56 Police officers investigating an auto theft found
an outstanding warrant for the defendant. They knocked on the defendant's

motel room door, stepped inside to pat
him down and asked if they could speak
with him. The defendant replied "sure"
and invited the officers into the room.
Inside, the officers noticed a weapon
and cuffed and advised the defendant. A
search of his room turned up evidence implicating the defendant in burglary, theft
and forgery.
The Clouse court first noted that the
police may constitutionally knock on a
door for investigative purposes because
the occupant retains the right to refuse to
open the door.57 The record supported the
trial court's conclusion that the defendant then validly consented to the entry
by the police officers. The search of the
motel room was justified
as a search in58
cident to the arrest.

Such implied consent has limits. In
People v. Lingo,59 the defendant and another person entered a prison facility for
a visit. Both the paperwork and the facility's signs put visitors on notice that
there would be a search. Just after they
walked through the metal detector, a
balloon with a white powdery substance
was found on the floor. The defendant
was arrested, questioned, taken to the
sheriff's office and searched. The trial
court found that there was no probable
cause justifying the arrest. The prosecution argued that the search fell within
the scope of the consent exception created by the consent form and warning sign.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the consent was limited to a search at the correctional facility and that the search at the sheriff's office exceeded the scope of that consent.

Tainted Consent
Improper police actions preceding a
consent may taint that consent and render it invalid. In People v. Cleburn, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that "when
consent is given after an interrogation
in violation of Miranda, the consent is
likely to be constitutionally infirm, tainted by the unconstitutional interrogation."6° Similarly, if consent is obtained
after an unlawful entry, it is likely to be
constitutionally infirm. 6 1 Consent obtained through deception by the police
is
62
generally tainted by that deception.
As in other search and seizure situations, the taint may become so attenuated that it no longer affects the validity of
the consent, and the trial court should
still consider the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's age,
education, intelligence and state of mind,
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as well as the duration, location and other circumstances of the search in determining whether consent has been voluntarily given.63
While consent may be tainted by improper police conduct prior to the consent, it is not tainted by the simple fact
that there is some sort of police-citizen
encounter prior to the consent. The defendant in Peoplev. Johnson6 was standing in line to board a plane when he was
approached by two police officers who
asked for identification and some other
information. They gave him back his identification and asked if he would consent
to a search, which he did.
The trial court found that there was
no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the initial contact and that the
subsequent consent was tainted by this
illegal contact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the initial contact
between the defendant and the police
did not even rise to the level of an investigatory stop and that the subsequent
consent to search given by the defendant was not tainted by the initial encounter. The consent issue should therefore be analyzed on its own merits, and
the court, after reviewing the relevant
factors, held the consent was voluntary.
The most recent review of a claim that
police action tainted a consent to search
came in People v. Gillis.6 5 As the police
were about to conduct a search of the
defendant's home, they realized that the
address was incorrectly listed on the
warrant. They told the defendant that
they would secure his house until a corrected warrant was obtained. The defendant then signed a consent to search form.
The Supreme Court affirmed a ruling
that this consent was voluntary, finding
that the police were entitled to secure
the home until the corrected warrant arrived and that there were no threats or
coercion, that the defendant's state of
mind was unimpaired, and that no promises were made in exchange for the consent.

Conclusion
It seems that a surprisingly high percentage of suspects in criminal cases cooperate with the police, either by making statements or authorizing searches
that incriminate themselves. Knowledge
of the contours of the consent exception
to the warrant requirement is important
to the effective practice of criminal law
and proper administration of the criminal justice system.
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